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Abstract 
Informed consent is a fundamental precept of modern medical care and pertains in those situations 
when a patient rejects a physician’s recommended treatment.  This article reports on the case of a 
pregnant woman in labor who refused the Caesarean section urged by her doctor.  The physician 
involved a consultant and the hospital attorney, and they decided to perform the surgery against her 
explicit wishes.  The arguments used to justify this unconsented intervention invoked fetal wellbeing.  
This article discusses the conflation of focus on the fetus, derived from anti-abortion argumentation, 
with the rights of the autonomous adult pregnant woman.  This article explores the implications of such 
forced surgery for the status of pregnant women as competent adults, the ethical underpinnings of the 
physician-patient relationship, and the law.
On July 25th, 2011 Rinat Dray arrived in early 
labor at the hospital where she had chosen to 
deliver because of its low cesarean section rate. 
She had had two prior cesarean sections, 
wanted more children, and understood that a 
third surgery would pose increased risks to her, 
likely making it impossible to find a physician 
who would provide care for subsequent vaginal 
deliveries. She had received prenatal care from 
a doctor who had agreed to attempt a vaginal 
delivery. The partner covering for her doctor 
immediately told her to have a cesarean 
because of the risks attendant upon having had 
two prior sections, but she objected. Eventually, 
he agreed that cesarean surgery might not be 
immediately necessary but as her labor 
progressed, the physician became increasingly 
insistent that she have surgery. When Ms. Dray 
did not agree, he called a maternal-fetal 
specialist for a consultation who reiterated the 
recommendation that she should have surgery. 
Ms. Dray declined. The specialist consulted the 
hospital’s counsel and noted in Ms. Dray’s 
record, “I find the woman has decisional 
capacity.… I have decided to override her 
decision not to have a cesarean section, her 
physician . . . and hospital attorney . . .   are in 
agreement.”  The physicians performed the 1
surgery over Ms. Dray’s protests. She delivered 
a healthy child, but sustained bladder bisection.
Obtaining consent from a competent patient is 
not only an ethical obligation in medicine, but 
also a legal one. With very few exceptions, the 
law vests the final decision-making authority in 
patients. Performance of a medical intervention, 
even a lifesaving one, against the patient’s 
wishes is a battery; failure to adequately inform 
the patient of risks and benefits with the 
intervention constitutes negligence. Indeed, New 
York law requires all hospitals to post a “Patient’s 
Bill of Rights” that includes the right to “refuse 
treatment and be told what effect this may have 
on your health.”  Even so, for the most part, the 2
underlying notion that patients are the final 
arbiters about treatment involving their bodies 
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rides low under the radar of both physicians and 
patients, and only emerges when physician and 
patient disagree and when the physician or 
medical institution takes action in defiance of the 
patient’s expressed wish. The law speaks to 
those difficult rare moments when the physician 
considers the patient’s decision to be wrong but 
nevertheless must abide by the patient’s 
decision.
Soon after Ms. Dray’s cesarean section, she 
decided to sue the physicians and hospital 
involved. By the time she had obtained her 
medical records and was able to find an attorney 
who would take her case, the one-year statute of 
limitations on battery had expired, so she sued 
for malpractice instead. The defendants argued 
that Ms. Dray’s claims amounted to a battery, not 
malpractice, and should therefore be dismissed 
as untimely. They did not dispute that the surgery 
had been performed without consent. Instead, 
they argued that because the state has an 
interest in the protection of potential life, 
physicians have an independent duty to act in 
what they believe is the best interest of a fetus, 
even if it were to mean risking the life of a 
competent but unwilling woman. This duty, they 
argued, need not be overseen by a court: a 
pregnant woman’s rights may be suspended 
upon the approval by the hospital’s risk 
management counsel.  3
While the court agreed that “the state cannot 
intervene to require lifesaving medical care over 
a competent adult’s refusal of care and that 
imposition of such care over a competent adult 
forms a basis for civil liability,” it went on to rule 
that when an “individual’s conduct threatens 
injury to others, the State’s interest is manifest 
and the State can generally be expected to 
intervene.”3 The trial court’s decision– which is 
currently being appealed and is not binding legal 
precedent --   raises two important questions. 
First, whether continuing a labor is “conduct” that 
threatens injury to others and therefore can or 
should be stopped by force of law. The court 
treated Ms. Dray’s refusal of the recommended 
surgery as “conduct,” even though her labor was 
a biological process not subject to voluntary 
control. In other words, their interpretation 
means that for a pregnant woman with a history 
of prior cesareans, merely continuing to exist 
without surgical intervention is an offense 
warranting state intervention. Second, it raises 
the question of whether the state’s interest in the 
protection of potential life permits private parties 
to appoint themselves as guarantors of fetal well-
being. If so, pregnant women become a unique 
class of adults for whom informed consent — 
which has long been recognized as a common 
law right with roots in the United States 
Constitution — does not pertain.4
To a clinician, the notion that one can predict 
possible harm with the level of certainty 
necessary to deprive a person of their 
constitutional rights must seem untenable. Even 
with the great strides that have been made in 
diagnosis and treatment in obstetrics, there are 
limits to what a physician can predict. For 
example, in one high profile case , an Illinois 5
woman was told that her baby had a “zero 
percent” prognosis for a good outcome from a 
vaginal delivery. Her healthcare providers urged 
the State’s Attorney to seek a court order to 
compel immediate surgery. The Appellate Court 
of Illinois refused to grant the order, ruling that 
even if the woman’s decision would lead to fetal 
demise, her constitutional rights protected her 
from being forcibly restrained, sedated, and 
operated upon.5  Ms. Doe went on to give birth to 
a healthy baby. Fortunately, every court with the 
power to create binding precedent, ruling with 
the benefit of a full hearing and record, has held 
that pregnant women have constitutional rights 
that are not abridged by pregnancy. Ms. Doe’s 
case was not the only one revealing the 
limitations of rigidly applying statistical probability 
to individuals. But, as the courts make clear, the 
woman’s rights and our society’s protection of 
individual dignity - not medical certainty - are 
determinative, even if the doctor’s prediction had 
been fulfilled.
The state’s interest in protection of potential life 
is generally invoked in the context of abortion. 
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Roe v. Wade 
that this state interest can be invoked to prohibit 
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abortion after fetal viability, unless the pregnant 
woman’s life or health is at stake.  However, 6
Paltrow and Flavin have documented hundreds 
of cases in which prosecutors and hospital 
attorneys asserted such an interest to justify 
arrests, detentions, and forced medical 
interventions on pregnant women whose conduct 
or situation disturbed those bringing the 
charges.  These included women who use 7
controlled substances, women with uncontrolled 
diabetes, Jehovah’s Witnesses who refused 
blood transfusion, and women who wished to 
deliver vaginally after cesarean surgery. While 
there is no law or legal precedent suspending 
women’s constitutional rights during pregnancy 
in the name of fetal well-being, these 
deprivations of liberty persist to present day and 
now number in the thousands. Worse, they 
create an atmosphere of fear and distrust among 
pregnant women, who fear that their physicians 
will turn them over to law enforcement or institute 
legal proceedings against them during labor.  8
Paltrow and Flavin thereby concluded that these 
deprivations of liberty fail to protect fetal health, 
and instead promote a second-class status for 
pregnant women.
No other class of persons in our society can be 
forced to undergo a medical procedure for the 
benefit of another person. In one frequently cited 
case, McFall v. Shimp, a Pennsylvania court 
refused to grant an order forcing a man to 
donate bone marrow to his cousin even though 
the marrow would save the cousin’s life.   The 9
court distinguished moral obligation from legal 
obligation — the man’s refusal was “morally 
indefensible,” but “for our law to compel 
defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body 
would change every concept and principle, upon 
which our society is founded.” This principle 
applies even if the person who would benefit is 
the child of the person being compelled. Indeed 
if Ms. Dray had given birth to a baby in need of a 
kidney, neither she nor her husband could be 
compelled to give one of their own. Nobody 
would argue that the hospital has the right to 
devise a policy by which it could approve and 
carry out a forced organ donation over the 
objection of the patient.
With the law firmly on Ms. Dray’s side, it is 
curious and troubling that the court went so far 
astray in its decision. It flouts legal precedents 
and sends a message to hospitals and 
physicians that in the name of fetal interests, 
they are free to defy maternal self-determination 
in a way that would be unthinkable for any other 
type of patient. Under this reasoning, virtually 
any cesarean could be performed without 
consent. From serious complications like cord 
prolapse or placental abruption to failure to 
progress, the risks might be deemed sufficient to 
allow an obstetrician ordering a cesarean section 
to make the case that they are standing for fetal 
rights. In fact, according to the court, “the risk to 
the mother’s well being is also relevant as to 
whether it was appropriate to override her 
desires,” implying that a patient might be forced 
to undergo surgery for her own good. And if a 
hospital can claim that it lacked sufficient time to 
consult a court when the woman was in labor for 
hours in broad daylight, any circumstance can be 
called exigent. Such scenarios do not align with 
the ethics of a profession dedicated to serving 
women’s health with dignity.
The status of the fetus is clearly highly contested 
in contemporary American society, and the fact 
that Ms. Dray’s fetus was hours away from birth 
likely heightened the surrounding emotions 
during her delivery. However, while it can be 
upsetting when patients make decisions with 
which we profoundly disagree, the physician’s 
fiduciary duty is to the laboring woman, and thus 
to honor her legal right to bodily integrity and to 
make decisions about her own medical 
treatment. These difficult and troubling situations 
are precisely the ones that call for physicians to 
heed the law and ACOG’s ethical practice 
guidelines.   Ms. Dray’s case shows that the law 10
may fail women; it is critical, then, that their 
physicians do not.
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